Hou and Moskowitz (2005) use common stock price delay in reflecting market-wide information to measure market frictions each individual firm faces. In this study, to better understand how the price formation process is affected by business cycle, we examine the relation between the aggregate stock price delay and changes in the economy. Surprisingly, while the stock market liquidity declines and market frictions increase before economic downturns, we find that the aggregate price delay decreases before recessions; and it increases before economic expansions when the stock market liquidity increases and market frictions decrease. Aggregate institutional holdings and aggregate analyst coverage as proxies for information production cannot account for the behavior of aggregate price delay. Instead, we find that the flight-to-quality behavior of investors is most responsible for changes in aggregate price delay.
Introduction
Fama's (1970) efficient market hypothesis posits that stock price quickly reflects available information. However, some stocks reflect market-wide information with a delay. Hou and Moskowitz (2005) use stock price delay in reflecting market-wide information to measure the extent of market frictions each individual firm encounters. Market frictions include transaction costs, stock illiquidity, and information asymmetry. They find that market frictions associated with lack of investor recognition appears the most responsible for causing price delay.
1 As firms become more popular, according to Hou and Moskowitz (2005) , price delay measures of those stocks should decrease.
While Hong, Lim, and Stein (2000) show that bad firm-specific news of small firms and firms with low analyst coverage travels slowly, McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) find that small stocks tend to quickly adjust to bad common information as conveyed through large stocks, but adjust slowly to good common information. 2 It is conceivable that small stocks are less liquid and face higher market frictions, which may cause price delay in reflecting information. What makes the findings of these studies interesting is that price delay is asymmetric and depends on information types.
1 Hou and Moskowitz (2005) 's investor recognition variables are log of institutional ownership, log of number of analysts, shareholders, and employees, log of advertising expense, a regional exchange dummy, the average distance between each stock's headquarters and all U.S. airports as well as the nearest airport, and the average airfare between the nearest airport and all U.S. airports.
2 McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) document a directional asymmetry in the small stock concurrent and lagged response to large stock movements. When returns on large stocks are negative, the concurrent beta for small stocks is high, but the lagged beta is insignificant. This regression result shows bad common information travels fast to large and small stocks. However, when returns on large stocks are positive, small stocks have small concurrent betas and very significant lagged betas. This finding suggests good common information travels slowly to small stocks.
To further understand the price formation process at the market level, we extend Hou and Moskowitz (2005) to study aggregate price delay. In particular, we are interested in learning what factors may affect aggregate price delay and how aggregate price delay behaves in business cycles. By examining these issues, we hope to shed some light on investor trading behavior around business cycles and on the source of asymmetric price delay in reflecting good versus bad common information. We find that aggregate stock price delay is pro-cyclical, i.e., more price delay during economic expansions and less so during economic recessions. Intriguingly, we also find that, instead of market frictions or information production, it is the flight-to-quality behavior of investors that is most responsible for changes in the aggregate stock price delay around business cycles.
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To assist our analysis, we lay out three hypotheses for explaining how aggregate price delay may change as investors anticipate and/or respond to business cycles. The first one is related to market frictions. It is well known that market frictions could cause price delay. 4 As Fama (1991) notes that "A weaker and economically more sensible version of the efficiency hypothesis says that prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs (Jensen (1978) )."
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) show that transaction costs on individual stocks are time-varying and tend to comove together. Hameed, Kang, and Viswanathan (2010) document that large stock market declines increase the demand for liquidity as agents liquidate their 3 According to Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) , the term "flight to quality" refers to a situation where market participants suddenly shift their portfolios toward securities with less risk. 4 Stocks may have no trading due to large bid-ask spreads. Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) derive a transaction cost measure from zero return days. French and Roll (1986) uses stock return variances to study the arrival of information and reaction of traders.
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positions across many assets and reduce the supply of liquidity as liquidity providers hit their wealth or funding constraints. Similarly, Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) show that stock liquidity tends to decline before a recession comes and start to improve before an expansion begins. Thus, the market frictions hypothesis predicts that aggregate price delay would increase as the economy heads toward a recession and decrease as the economy starts to expand.
The second hypothesis is related to information production. Information production activities, such as economists making macroeconomic forecasts, financial analysts generating research reports on individual firms, and companies announcing earnings, help institutional investors and individual investors to make investment decisions and allocate their wealth to the most efficient use. Veldkamp (2005) shows that information production activities increase during periods of economic expansions and decrease during periods of recessions. 5 Brockman, Liebenberg, and Schutte (2010) further explore connections among comovement of stocks, information production, and business cycle. 6 They find that when information production is high (low), comovement is low (high) and that comovement patterns are countercyclical. Their findings imply that when information production on individual firms is lower, market-wide information becomes more important, causing individual stocks to comove more. Thus, to the extent that more comovement speeds up the incorporating of market-wide information into stock 5 Veldkamp (2006) hypothesizes when information is costly, rational investors only buy information about a subset of assets. Because information production has high fixed costs, competitive producers charge more for low-demand information than for high-demand information. The low price of high-demand information makes investors want to purchase the same information that others are purchasing.
prices, the information production hypothesis predicts that less information production would lead to less aggregate price delay during recessions.
The third hypothesis is related to the flight-to-quality behavior of investors, which refers to the tendency that when they anticipate the economy is going to enter a recession, investors sell risky stocks quickly and shift their funds toward safe securities (see, e.g., Longstaff (2004) and Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) ). In line with this hypothesis, McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) conjecture that investors attempt to sell all stocks quickly when news about the economy is bad; conversely, when the news is good, investors quickly buy large, easy to price stocks but take their time and shop around before buying smaller stocks. Thus, the flight-toquality hypothesis argues that the rush to sell risky stocks, large and small, could speeds up stock prices to reflect the market-wide information about the coming of a recession, and that aggregate price delay would increase due to small, illiquid stocks being left behind when the economy starts to expand.
We empirically test the aforementioned three hypotheses. First of all, to test the market frictions hypothesis, we use Amihud's (2002) illiquidity measure and aggregate it across stocks in each quarter to obtain an aggregate quarterly measure of market frictions. Our empirical results show that, consistent with Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011), the aggregate market illiquidity starts to increase before a recession is declared and begins to decrease before an expansion starts. Interestingly, the aggregate stock price delay is inversely related to the aggregate stock market illiquidity. The aggregate stock price delay declines before a recession comes, and rises before a recession ends. Thus, the evidence is inconsistent with the hypothesis that the change in aggregate stock price delay is caused by market frictions. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we review the literature on market friction hypothesis, information production hypothesis, and flight-to-quality hypothesis. Section 3 describes our data and variables used in this paper. Section 4 reports empirical results. Section 5 concludes our paper. 
Market Friction Hypothesis
Fama (1970) argues that the theory of efficient markets is concerned with whether prices at any point in time "fully reflect" available information. While presenting several supporting evidence of semi-strong form market efficiency in which stock prices fully reflect all public available information, Fama (1991) proposes a weaker and economically more sensible version of the efficiency hypothesis in which prices reflect information to the point where the marginal benefits of acting on information (the profits to be made) do not exceed the marginal costs.
Accordingly, an increase in trading costs would reduce investors' trading propensity, and slow down the speed with which information is impounded into stock prices.
While Hou and Moskowitz (2005) argue that price delay in reflecting public information is mainly due to low investor recognition, Lin et al. (2012) show that the price delay phenomenon can be better explained by the incidence of nontrading, as measured by Liu's (2006) turnover adjusted non-trading days. Since investors may endogenously decide not to trade if transaction costs outweigh the trading benefits (Lesmond, Ogden, and Trzcinka (1999) ), more incidence of nontrading implies higher (latent) transaction costs. Thus, the evidence presented by Lin et al. (2012) is consistent with the market frictions hypothesis that transaction costs hinder the transmission of market-wide information, and are the main source of price delay.
In addition, previous studies also provide evidence that price delay results from high transaction costs. For example, Lin and Rozeff (1995) examine price adjustment between in-themoney convertible preferred stock prices and their underlying common stock prices, and find that the price deviation from theoretical prediction between these two securities could be largely 9 attributed to the transaction costs of arbitrage. Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2008) study the relationship between the size of bid-ask spread and market efficiency. They find that shorthorizon return predictability from order flows is diminished when bid-ask spreads are narrower, and has declined over time with the minimum tick size. Their findings indicate that liquidity stimulates arbitrage activity, which, in turn, enhances market efficiency. Therefore, stock market liquidity affects arbitrage activities and further enhance market efficiency.
Chordia, Roll, and Subrahmanyam (2000) show that transaction costs, such as quoted spreads, quoted depth, and effective spreads, of individual stocks are time-varying and tend to comove with the aggregate transaction cost of the stock market. Hameed, Kang, and
Viswanathan (2010) use proportional bid-ask spread as their key measure of liquidity and find changes in spreads are negatively related to market returns. Acharya and Pedersen (2005) identify those two correlations as commonality and flight-to-quality liquidity risk measures. Naes, Skjeltorp, and Ødegaard (2011) also find stock market liquidity declines before recessions and starts to improve before expansions. Since an increase in transaction costs may lead to more stock price delay, the market frictions hypothesis posits that aggregate stock price delay will increase as the economy approaches to a recession and the stock market becomes less liquid, and that aggregate stock price delay will decrease as the economy starts to expand and the market becomes more liquid.
Information Production Hypothesis
Morck, Yeung, and Yu (2000) document that stock prices move together more in poor economies than in rich economies. They attribute their finding to investor property rightshigher firm-specific returns variation is associated with stronger public investor property rights.
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In addition, Jin and Myers (2006) show that opaqueness (lack of transparency) is positively correlated with R-square of economies observed in the world. Their studies imply that stocks comove less in a more open information sharing environment and in an environment which encourages information production.
Veldkamp (2005) derives a model to show that agents undertake more economic activities in good times than in bad and that economic activity generates public information about the state of the economy. Following the logic of Morck et al. (2000) and Jin and Myers (2006), we can assume stocks may comove less in good times since good economy state encourages information production. Brockman, Liebenberg, and Schutte (2010) empirically substantiate the relation between information production and stock price comovement. They find when information production is high (low), stock price comovement is low (high). In addition, they find that comovement patterns are countercyclical.
Veldkamp ( They document that neglected stocks are priced using easily available information about other stocks that share similar fundamentals. They use number of analysts following a stock to distinguish "high profile" stocks from neglected stocks and find that prices of neglected stocks tend to comove with those stocks covered by analysts.
Since information production activity is low in bad times, we may assume information is more costly in bad times. Hence, stocks comove more with easily available market-wide information. To the extent that more comovement speeds up the incorporation of market-wide information into stock prices, our information production hypothesis assumes that less information production activity will cause less aggregate price delay during bad times.
Flight-to-quality Hypothesis
Investors tend to be more alerted and to seek safety when market news is bad. Barberis, Shleifer, and Wurgler (2005) Longstaff (2004) documents that changes in consumer confidence, the amount of Treasury debt available to investors, and flows into equity and money market mutual funds affect the flight-to-quality liquidity premium in Treasury bond prices by comparing them with prices of bonds issued by Refcorp, a U.S. government agency, whose repayment of both coupon payments and principal amounts is implicitly guaranteed by the U.S. Treasury. Naes, Skjeltorp, and
Ødegaard (2011) continue examining the flight-to-quality phenomenon. They use Lesmond et al.
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(1999) implicit trading cost measure, Roll (1984) estimate of the implicit spread, and Amihud (2002) price impact measure as liquidity measures in their study and find changes of these liquidity measures can predict future real GDP growth, changes in unemployment rate, real consumption growth, and growth in private investment after controlling current real GDP growth, term spread, credit spread, market volatility, and market excess return. They suggest their findings emerge from the flight-to-quality behavior of investors changing their portfolio compositions from small, illiquid stocks to liquid, low risk securities.
McQueen, Pinegar, and Thorley (1996) provide another evidence to support the flight-toquality phenomenon. They find public bad news reflects in small stocks without much delay and a delayed reaction to good news for small stocks. They conjecture investors attempt to sell all stocks quickly when the market news is bad and take time to shop around small stocks when the market news is good. Intrigued by their findings and the flight-to-quality behavior of investors, we develop our flight-to-quality hypothesis. Our flight-to-quality hypothesis claims that the rush of investors to sell all risky stocks will speed up stock prices to reflect the market-wide information about the coming of a recession and that aggregate stock price delay will decrease due to small, illiquid stocks being left behind when the economy starts to expand. Aggregate stock price delay should be pro-cyclical according to the flight-to-quality hypothesis.
Data
We use Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP) to collect stock return information.
Our sample includes common stocks (with share code 10 or 11) listed on the NYSE from Jan 1945 to Dec 2010. In addition, we require each stock in our sample to be listed for the whole calendar year and its daily share price should be greater than $1 per share during the whole 
Price Delay Measure
We follow Hou and Moskowitz (2005) to construct our price delay measure. The regression equations are as follows:
where t j r , is the weekly return of stock j and t m R , is the CRSP value-weighted market return in week t . For stocks in our sample, we run time series regressions (52 past weekly observations) for both equation (1) and (2) every week from 1947 to 2010 to get the 2 R from both the restricted regression (1) and unrestricted regression (2). The price delay measure in our study is defined as follows:
The intuition of this measure could be described as follows: the 
GDP Growth
We use seasonally adjusted quarterly real gross domestic product (GDP) each stock in the sample to represent the stock market friction measure. Since it is an illiquidity measure, a higher number of the measure means a less liquid stock market and the market friction is high. We also take a logarithm difference of the aggregate price impact to measure the market friction change in the stock market from 1947Q2 to 2010Q4.
Information Production Variables
We use institutional ownership, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst earnings estimates for information production proxies in our study. For institutional ownership, we divide the sum of shares owned of institutions by shares outstanding of the firm to calculate each sample firm's institutional holding. For each quarter, we take the equally-weighted average of each sample firm's institutional holding to be the aggregate institutional holding and take logarithm difference of the aggregate institutional holding to measure changes in aggregate institutional ownership from 1985Q1 to 2010Q4.
For analyst coverage, for firms' fiscal quarter end in January, February, and last December, their observations on I/B/E/S are classified into the first quarter of the current year.
Similarly, for firms' fiscal quarter end in September, October, and November, their observations on I/B/E/S are classified into the fourth quarter of the current year. For each firm, we take the latest number of analysts for earnings estimates for each estimated period to be a firm's analyst coverage. We further take the equally-weighted average of each firm's analyst coverage to be the aggregate analyst coverage and take logarithm difference of the aggregate analyst coverage to measure changes in aggregate analyst coverage from 1985Q1 to 2010Q4.
For the dispersion of analyst earnings estimates, we follow the same quarter definition as analyst coverage. We take the standard deviation of each analyst's earnings forecast of a firm in a quarter to be the firm's dispersion of analyst earnings estimates. We winsorize firms with extreme value at 99%. We further take the equally-weighted average of each firm's dispersion of analyst earnings estimates to be aggregate dispersion of analyst earnings estimates and take 
Flight-to-quality Variables
When the market news is bad, investors tend to sell all stocks quickly. Under this circumstance, the stock market return is usually very negative and the market volatility is relatively high. Therefore, we use stock market return and stock market volatility to be flight-toquality variables in our study. For the stock market return, we use the cumulative 3-month monthly S&P 500 index return to calculate the quarterly stock market return. For the stock market volatility, we calculate each sample stock's quarterly return volatility and then take the equally-weighted average of these sample stocks' return volatility to be the quarterly market volatility. We also include equally-weighted average of daily VIX to represent the quarterly market volatility from 1990Q1 to 2010Q4. In addition, Longstaff (2004) finds investors tend to move their wealth into less risky securities when consumer confidence is lower. Furthermore, investors also have higher demand for U.S. dollars when their uncertainty about the economy is high. Therefore, we also use quarterly change of consumer confidence index and quarterly change of U.S. dollar index from Bloomberg to be another two proxies for flight-to-quality variables from 1967Q3 to 2010Q4.
Results

Summary Statistics of Variables
Our study investigates the relation between stock price delay and business cycle. As shown in Fig 1, the aggregate stock price delay comoves with the real GDP growth rate. The aggregate stock price delay tends to go higher when the GDP growth rate is higher. In addition, For the past eleven recessions, aggregate stock price delay tends to decline, analyst coverage tends to decrease, price impact increases, market return is negative, consumer confidence drops, and term spread also shortens. On average in the recession starting quarter, aggregate stock price delay declines 10.8%, analyst coverage decreases 2.22%, stock market price impact increases 7.59%, quarterly market return is negative 6.94%, consumer confidence index drops 9.18%, and term spread becomes narrower to 0.36%. When recessions end, aggregate stock price delay increases 1.24% , analyst coverage increases 3.57%, stock market price impact decreases 35.91%, quarterly market return is positive 12.46%, consumer confidence index increases 7.38%, and term spread becomes wider to 2.20%. Table II reports the correlation among variables used in this study. The real GDP growth has statistically significant correlation with variables in the previous quarter: positive correlation 23% with the aggregate price delay change, positive correlation 13% with institutional holding change, positive correlation 20% with analyst coverage change, negative correlation 35% with stock market price impact, positive correlation 29% with stock market return, negative correlation 28% with stock market volatility, negative correlation 34% with VIX, positive correlation 38% with consumer confidence change, positive correlation 15% with term spread, and negative correlation 22% with default spread.
20
One interesting observation here is the aggregate analyst coverage change has a positive correlation with future GDP growth. For the main variable aggregate price delay change, we find it has a negative correlation 29% with the aggregate stock market price impact change, a positive correlation 33% with market return, a negative correlation 32% with stock market volatility, and a negative correlation 35% with VIX. We continue investigating aggregate stock price delay change property in the following tables. For the institutional ownership change, we find it has a negative correlation 47% with stock market price impact change, a positive correlation 24% with stock market return, and a negative correlation 23% with stock market volatility. Analyst coverage change has a positive correlation 33% with dispersion of analyst earnings estimates and suggests that more information productivity may lead to more different opinions from analysts. Finally, term spread has a positive correlation 29% with default spread.
Regression Results
We examine the prediction power of the aggregate stock price delay change on future GDP growth in Table III . The model estimated is as follows: 
The aggregate price delay change significantly predict future GDP growth rate after we add current GDP growth rate, aggregate stock price impact change, term spread, and default spread.
However, the predictable power of the aggregate stock price delay change disappears after we add market excess return and stock market volatility into our regression. This result may be due to the high correlation 33% between stock market return and the aggregate stock price delay change. The aggregate stock price impact change still maintains its explanatory power on future GDP growth rate. Hence, stock market liquidity change is more powerful than stock price delay change in predicting future economy change.
We test the market frictions hypothesis in Table IV . The model estimated is as follows:
The results show that the change in the aggregate stock price impact significantly explains the change in the aggregate price delay. However, the sign is negative, which is in contrast to our prediction that higher market frictions lead to higher stock price delay. Our results show that the 22 aggregate stock price delay tends to decline when market frictions are higher. Hence, our empirical evidence contradicts our market friction hypothesis.
We test our information production hypothesis in Table V . The models estimated are as follows: 
The results show that changes in institutional ownership, changes in analyst coverage, and changes in dispersion of analyst earnings estimates fail to significantly explain the change in the aggregate stock price delay although their coefficients are positive. Hence, we reject our information production hypothesis.
Finally, we test our flight-to-quality hypothesis in Table VI . The models estimated are as follows: 
Our empirical results show that both current market return and market volatility significantly explain the changes in the aggregate stock price delay. The aggregate stock price delay tends to increase when the stock market return is negative and when the stock market volatility is higher.
Changes in consumer confidence index and changes in U.S. dollar index fail to significantly explain changes in aggregate stock price delay. After we add the change in stock market price impact into the regression, the explanation power of the flight-to-quality variables still exists.
Therefore, we attribute the aggregate price delay change to flight-to-quality behavior of investors.
Conclusion
This paper studies the relationship between stock price delay and business cycle. We empirically test whether information production, market friction, and flight-to-quality could provide explanations for stock price delay change in a business cycle. Our findings show that institutional holding, analyst coverage, and dispersion of analyst earnings estimates could not significantly account for changes in stock price delay through time. In addition, while stock market liquidity dries up and transaction costs increase during a recession, stock price delay declines and market information transmission become faster in the meantime. Finally, stock market return, stock market volatility, changes in consumer confidence index, and changes in U.S. dollar index subsume a great portion of stock price delay variation during business cycles.
Our results imply when investors feel high level of uncertainty when market news is bad, they sell risky securities such as stocks. Because high transaction costs of stocks will not hinder 24 investors' selling activities that much when investors' expectation about economy is bad, we conclude flight-to-quality behavior of investors most accounts for stock price delay change in a business cycle.
Previous studies show that stocks tend to comove when the market news is bad. We add new evidence that stocks reflect market information faster when current market news is bad and future GDP growth is going to slow down. We find stock price delay acts pro-cyclically and only the flight-to-quality behavior of investors explains this phenomenon well. This finding helps our understanding of stock price formation process during the transitions of business cycles and provides another indicator for the future economy state. 
Table I Sample Characteristics
This table reports the average value of variables used in this study during the whole sample period and each sub-periods. The sample firms include NYSE common stocks with stock price above $1 and listing for the whole calendar year during the sample period from 1947Q1 to 2010Q4. The aggregate price delay change dAggreD1 t is the logarithm difference between each equally-weighted individual stock price delay of each quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The real GDP growth dGDPR t is the logarithm difference of real GDP between current quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate institutional holding change dINSHD t is the logarithm difference between the equally-weighted average of percentages of sample stocks held by institution investors of quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate analyst coverage change dANALYST t is the logarithm difference between the equally-weighted number of analysts of individual stocks of quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate dispersion of analyst earnings estimates is the logarithm difference between the equally-weighted standard deviation of analyst earnings estimates of each company of quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The aggregate price impact change dILLIQ t is the logarithm difference between the equallyweighted quarterly individual stock price impact from Amuhuid (2002) of quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The market return Mkret t is the 3-month cumulative monthly S&P 500 index return of the quarter. The market volatility Volatility t is from equally weighted average of the sample firms' stock return standard deviation during the quarter. The VIX index VIX t is the implied volatility of S&P500 index from CBOE. The consumer confidence index change dCCI t is the logarithm difference between the quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The U.S. dollar index change dUSDindex t is the logarithm difference between the quarter t and previous quarter t-1. The term spread Term_spread t is the yield difference between 10-year Treasury note rate and 3-month Treasury bill rate. The default spread Default_ spread t is the difference between Moody's Baa bond yield and Moody's Aaa bond yield. Throughout the study, the term spread information starts from 1953Q3, the consumer confidence index and U.S. dollar index start from 1967Q3, the institutional ownership change and the aggregate analyst coverage change information starts from 1985Q1, the aggregate institutional holding change information ends in 2008Q4, and the S&P implied volatility index starts from 1990Q1. 1947Q1 to 2010Q4 1953Q3 to 2010Q4 1967Q3 to 2010Q4 1985Q1 to 2008Q4 1990Q1 
